Limited investor attention allows overvalued companies to engage in stock-financed acquisitions of listed target firms without experiencing significant reductions in their existing valuations. Our robust findings show that overvalued stock-paying acquirers that are subject to limited investor attention do not experience significant announcement period wealth losses. However, the overvaluation of these acquirers is corrected in the post-announcement period. On the contrary, the overvalued acquirers that receive high investor attention and use stock as the payment method in their listed-target acquisitions experience negative announcement period abnormal returns. The widely documented evidence that stock-financed acquisitions are associated with significant announcement period wealth losses is primarily driven by deals in which the acquirers are subject to high investor attention. 
Introduction
One of the stylized findings in the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) literature is that stockfinanced acquisitions of listed targets are associated with significant acquirer wealth losses relative to cash-financed counterparts (Fu et al., 2014; Fuller et al., 2002; Golubov et al., 2015; Travlos, 1987) . 1 The negative acquirer abnormal returns associated with such M&As are interpreted as evidence suggesting that the acquiring firms are using their overvalued shares to finance their takeovers (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Emphasizing the role of stock overvaluation as a determinant of the payment method in M&A, the theoretical models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) depict firms that aim to benefit from market-optimism-driven overvaluation by being involved in M&As with target firms that are relatively less overvalued. Jensen (2005) , in turn, argues that overvalued equity erodes managerial discipline and leads to wasteful stock-financed acquisitions. As a result, equity investors treat the use of the acquirer stock as the payment method in M&As as a signal that such stock is potentially overvalued. Consequently, they react to the announcement of such M&As by selling (or short-selling) the shares (Travlos, 1987) . Despite the rich volume of research outputs in the related field, 3 there are still noticeable gaps in our understanding of (a) the trade-off between the gains that the acquiring firms (and/or their managers) realize from stock-financed acquisitions when the acquirer stock is considered to be overvalued and, (b) the shareholders wealth losses arising from the negative market reaction around to acquisition announcements.
In this paper we trace this issue by starting with the premise that the attention of equity investors that is dedicated to the acquiring firm is a scarce cognitive resource (Barber and Odean, 2008; Kahneman, 1973) . We primarily argue that the degree of investor attention that an overvalued (acquiring) firm receives affects its short-and long-run abnormal returns following the announcement of a merger.
(i.e., abnormal returns) to corporate announcements. Among others, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) document a weak stock market reaction to the release of corporate news with their weekend plans. Similarly, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) report evidence suggesting that the stock market reaction to earnings surprises is weak on days during which other firms announce earnings surprises. Even if the stock market ends up accommodating the impact of bad news, the corporate revealed in their corporate 1 throughout this paper refers exclusively to listed-target acquisitions.
2 method in an acquisition. These range from the opportunistic desire of the target management to cash out quickly before the completion date of the deal (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) point of view (Rhodes Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) , among others. 3 For a review see Eckbo (2009). announcements reduces the reputational sanction that they might anticipate (DeHaan et al., 2015) .
Because the content of takeover announcements tends to be highly complex and less standardized than other corporate announcements such as earnings or dividends (Louis and Sun, 2010) , we predict that overvalued firms that are exposed to limited investor attention manage to engage in stock-financed acquisitions without experiencing significant announcement period wealth losses.
A simplified example can further depict how the stock market reaction to two stock-financed (listed-target) acquisitions, that are announced by two overvalued firms, depends on the degree of investor attention that each of the acquiring firms receives. Take the case of two firms i and j whose securities are equally overvalued. Such information is only (temporarily) known by the insiders of each of the firms.
However, firm i receives more investor attention than firm j. If the managers of both firms are short-term oriented and expect the same short-term aggregate payoffs from the stock-financed acquisitions, the low investor attention dedicated to firm j potentially limits the size of the initial and negative market reaction.
That is, even if the use of stock as a payment method raises doubts by equity investors that firm j are overvalued, these investors require an extended period to collect the relevant, and perhaps previously overlooked, information to re-assess the valuation of firm j. On the contrary, due to the increased investor scrutiny, firm i decision to engage in a stock-financed acquisition is likely to trigger significant announcement period declines in its existing valuation, which erodes a large part of the short-term payoffs.
This analysis leads to a rich set of empirical predictions about the short-and long-run abnormal returns associated with stock-financed M&As. We primarily argue that these abnormal returns will be dependent on the degree of investor scrutiny that the acquiring firm is receiving during a sufficient period preceding the day of the merger announcement. First, if limited investor attention reduces the degree of the stock market reaction to overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions, we expect the overvalued firms that are subject to limited investor attention to be more actively involved in stockfinanced acquisitions relative to counterparts that are subject to high investor attention. Second, we expect the overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions announced by acquirers subject to limited investor scrutiny to be associated with limited wealth losses in the short-run relative to counterparts that are subject to high investor attention. Lastly, if the initial market reaction to stock-financed acquisitions announced by overvalued acquirers that are exposed to limited investor attention is imperfect, we expect these acquirers to experience negative post-acquisition abnormal returns relative to counterparts that receive high investor attention.
By using the acquirer pre-acquisition trading volume as a proxy for the degree of investor attention, in addition to the overvaluation measure estimated using the method proposed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) , the empirical analysis in this paper offers several new and compelling findings. First, evidence from our Logit model predicting the choice of the payment method in the M&A suggests that overvalued acquirers that are subject to low investor attention are more likely to engage in stock-rather cash-financed deals. This finding reinforces the notion that low investor attention encourages acquirers to announce their overvaluation-driven stock-financed deals by anticipating limited reductions in their current valuations.
Second, our analysis of the announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) suggests that overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention do not experience significant announcement period wealth losses around stock-financed acquisitions. Specifically, we find that stock-financed acquisitions that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention break-even as in the case of cash-financed acquisitions. On the contrary, overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention experience 4 to 6 percentage point declines around the announcement day of stock-financed acquisitions.
To assess the robustness of our findings, we rely on the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method and re-assess the valuation effects of investor attention across stock-financed deals. Our PSMbased (robust) findings reveal that the stock-financed deals in which the acquirer is subject to low investor attention yield announcement period CAR that is 3.5 percentage points higher than the CAR of comparable deals in which the acquirer is subject to high investor scrutiny. To determine the sensitivity of our PSM-based findings to the bias caused by potential missing covariates from the matching exercise, we rely on the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds analysis. This methodology quantifies the effect that a missing covariate should have on the likelihood of the acquirer classification into the low investor attention group to invalidate our (PSM-based) conclusions. The findings suggest that, for two comparable deals, a missing covariate should increase the likelihood of the acquirer to low investor scrutiny by more than 50% to invalidate our PSM-based conclusions. When assessed relative to previous findings in the corporate finance literature (Barbopoulos and Adra, 2016; Peel and Makepeace, 2012) , this evidence suggests that our findings are, to a large extent, insensitive to the effect of a confounding variable.
To further highlight the role of the acquirer overvaluation and its interaction with the degree of investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm, we re-estimate our multivariate regressions on the matched (treated and control) sample. The results confirm our initial conclusions by emphasizing a significant negative valuation effect of the acquirer overvaluation in deals subject to high investor attention. Moreover, this negative wealth effect is neutralized in the group of deals announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention.
Our third task is to examine potential time fractions in assessing the valuation effects of overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions announced by companies subject to low (high)
investor attention. Our analysis reveals that overvaluation-driven stock-financed acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention are associated with significant post-acquisition losses. Put together, these findings suggest that the correction of the acquirer overvaluation is not immediate but rather depends on the degree of attention dedicated by equity investors to the acquiring firm during the period preceding the M&A announcement. Overall, the widely cited evidence that stockfinanced M&As are associated with immediate announcement period wealth losses is driven by deals announced by acquirers subject to high rather than low investor attention during the period preceding the M&A announcement. The overvaluation of stock-paying acquirers subject to limited investor attention is only corrected in the long-run.
The results of this paper contribute to the arrays of studies related to both M&A and investor scrutiny. Specifically, this paper highlights the moderating role of investor scrutiny in the relationship between the choice of payment method in M&A and the acquirer abnormal returns. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) emphasize the role of the acquiring overvaluation in motivating the initiation of stock-financed acquisitions. In the attention-related literature, Louis and Sun (2010) Fridays. Louis and Sun (2010) attribute this result to the limited investor attention of stock market participants preoccupied with their weekend plans. Our findings extend both results by showing that overvalued acquirers exploit the limited investor scrutiny to announce their stock-financed acquisitions.
Moreover, our analysis of the long-run wealth effects of stock-financed acquisitions demonstrates that the stock market requires a considerable period to correct the acquirer overvaluation when the acquiring firm is subject to low market scrutiny. Our results also complement the recent findings by DeHaan et al. (2015) and Michaely et al. (2016) related to the efforts of corporate managers to exploit the limited investor attention to strategically time their corporate announcements. Lastly, our findings are robust to alternative model specifications and measures of investor attention such as the Roll (1988) nonsynchronicity measure.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents a parsimonious model that determines the conditions under which overvalued acquirers proceed with stock-financed M&As without experiencing large announcement period wealth losses; Section 3 describes our proxies of investor attention and acquirer overvaluation; Section 4 presents our dataset and discusses both the sample statistics and the univariate results; Section 5 presents and discusses the sensitivities related to the decision of the acquirer to use its stock in the financing process of the deal, as well as the multivariate analysis of the acquirer short-run abnormal returns; Section 6 illustrates the PSM-based findings and the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds sensitivity analysis; Section 7 discusses the long-run acquirer abnormal returns; Section 8 demonstrates how our multivariate results hold when we employ an alternative measures of acquirer investor attention:
the Roll R
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, and finally, Section 9 offers a conclusion.
The Choice of O vervaluation-driven Stock Financing
Consider a potential acquiring firm whose market value temporarily exceeds its fundamental value by , which is only known to the acquiring firm insiders. The insiders, who understand the temporary aspect of this overvaluation, are considering the prospects of exploiting their excess valuation in a stock-financed acquisition to realize short-term payoffs from increasing their size. The net payoff from such acquisition is presented as follows:
( 1) is a factor representing the acquiring f to realize short-term gains before the entire extent of overvaluation is captured by equity investors. In the presence of principal agent problems, can represent the managerial privileges after relying on stock- (Jensen, 2005) . The costs associated with a stock-financed acquisition have two components. is a factor reflecting the additional deal-related costs that arise from the use of overvalued stock, as a fraction of the degree of overvaluation. For instance, if the firm insists on financing the deal with its own stock, the target firm might demand higher premium to participate in the deal. Therefore, the product is the additional payment that the acquiring firm is willing to make to the target in order to convince the target shareholders to accept its shares as the medium of exchange. In turn, are costs of the deal such as and the advisory fees.
is the part of the overvaluation that is corrected at the time of the deal announcement with . Because the value of is primarily dependent on the extent to which the market participants investigate the acquirer degree of overvaluation and their attempts to correct it, can be presented as follows:
with . The size of is a positive function of which is the level of investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm. Even if the acquirer uses overvalued shares as a payment method in the deal, the limited investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm during the period preceding the deal announcement complicates the task of market participants to correctly re-valuate the acquirer shares. In particular, in order to accurately determine the extent of the acquirer overvaluation, market participants have to re-assess the information released through previous corporate announcements, accounting data, and price fluctuations that they have overlooked. Given that various other corporate events are also sk of re-evaluating the acquirer shares is likely to require an extended period beyond the limited window around the takeover announcement.
Replacing (2) in (1) with yields:
When the level of investor attention is relatively high, i.e. above the threshold , the announcement of a stock-financed deal leads to substantial corrections in the acquirer existing valuation. Such corrections erode the gains that the acquirer expects from the deal. In the presence of agency problems, the significant announcement period wealth losses can also jeopardize the position of the acquiring managers that decide to engage in a wealth-destroying overvaluation-driven acquisition.
The immediate consequence of this argument is that firms subject to limited investor attention are encouraged to use their overvalued shares as the medium of exchange in M&As.
Empirically, we predict that the acquiring firms subject to limited investor scrutiny announce overvaluation-driven stock-financed M&As that are associated with limited short-run wealth losses. We further predict that the overvaluation of these acquiring firms is only corrected in the post-M&A-announcement period.
Measures of Investor Attention and F irm Overvaluation
This section presents the investor attention proxy that we employ in this paper, as well as the measures of valuation error of the acquiring firm. The proxy for investor attention is based on the fraction of traded shares relative to its listed shares in the days preceding the acquisition announcement. 4 The underlying assumption supporting this proxy is that the firms subject to high investor attention are those with relatively large fraction of their shares subject to daily trading activity. The measure of firm-specific overvaluation, in turn, is based on the method proposed by Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2005) via which we decompose the acquir market-to-book value ratio. 4 In the robustness section, R 2 measure as a proxy of investor attention. We discuss in detail the relevance of this proxy in the Section 8. We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging the incorporation of a second measure in our analysis.
Trading volume
The volume of a traded shares has been used in previous research as a proxy of the degree of investor attention. The seminal paper of Miller (1977) suggests that high trading volume causes investors to look in more detail at a particular stock. Gervais et al. (2001) show that the increase in a high demand. The same authors show that stocks subject to high trading activities are traded at a premium. Kaniel et al. (2012) further show that the valuereturn premium is present in both developed and developing markets. They also attribute their results to Merton's (1987) recognition theory which suggests that the increase in attention to particular stocks boosts their value due to (a) the reduction in the estimation risk faced by traders and, (b) the facilitation of risk sharing.
In this paper, we use the standardized trading volume of the acquiring firm before the acquisition announcement as a measure of investor attention. For the period from 43 to 10 days before the acquisition announcement, we estimate the average daily percentage of the traded shares relative to all listed shares.
An acquiring firm is considered subject to high investor attention when the average daily percentage of traded shares relative to all listed shares exceeds the 70 th percentile in the corresponding sample (i.e. High Trading). Otherwise, the firm is considered subject to low pre-acquisition investor attention and consequently subject to low trading activity (i.e. Low Trading).
Firm Overvaluation and Book-to-Market Decomposition
In order to quantify the degree of acquirer valuation error in our analysis, we decompose the book-to-market value of the acquirer into its components of growth option and misvaluation, as in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Fu et al. (2014) . Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decompose a marketto-book value ratio into three components: firm-specific valuation error, time-series sector-specific valuation error and, long-run growth potentials.
In particular, the log market-to-book value ratio can be presented as follows: (4) with and indicating the log of market value and book value , respectively, of firm at month . sector s valuation, which is represented by . is the difference between the sector-specific valuation and the long-run industry multiple . Finally, is the longrun value-to-book measure of the firm, which is a proxy for its growth potentials.
We proceed by estimating the cross-sectional regressions of the acquirer s market value on its book value, by sector j and year t. Rhodes Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose the following models:
where: is the log book value of the acquiring firm , is the log absolute value of the acquirer net income, is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 when , and is the market leverage of firm . Our reported estimations are obtained through the Equation (5). The restriction that both merging firms are publicly listed ensures that the relevant firm-specific variables are disclosed and hence available to be used in our empirical analysis. The restriction that the acquirer ends up controlling 100% of the target is introduced to ensure that the acquirers in the sample have the same objective of full target ownership. Moreover, the sample is limited to full cash and full stock financed deals in order to explicitly distinguish between the two payment methods across our analysis, as in Golubov et al. (2015) . Table 1 (Insert Table 1 about here) Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables entering our empirical analysis, i.e.
firm-and deal-specific factors that are controlled for in our multivariate analysis. As in and Fuller et al. (2002) , the acquirer CAR is measured as the sum of the daily differences between the acquirer returns and the returns of an overall market index (NYSE firms) over the 5-day event-window (t-2, t+2) around the deal announcement day (i.e. day t=0). The acquirer CAR mean of 0.23% confirms the findings in previous research that the average M&A does not add value to the shareholders of the acquiring firm (Alexandridis et al., 2010) . However, the high standard deviation of the acquirer CAR suggests a substantial variation in the acquirer wealth effects. To measure the postacquisition returns, we follow Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) by estimating the acquirer holding period excess returns over the corresponding market index returns, which are estimated for the holding periods of 12 and 24 months from the end of the acquisition completion month. We exclude the multiple deals announced by the same acquirer during, before and after the calendar month of the acquisition announcement to ensure that the long-run acquirer abnormal returns in various deals are not conflated.
Our initial findings suggest that M&As are, on average, associated with post-acquisition declines of the acquirer value in the 12 months (-6.33%) and 24 months (-9.19%) following the second month from the , consistent with earlier studies such as Loughran and Vijh (1997) .
(Insert Table 2 about here)
To ensure that the size and growth opportunity of both merging firms are properly controlled for in our analysis, the acquirer and the target firms market values and market-to-book value ratios, at 43 days before the acquisition announcement day, are introduced in the relevant models. Moreover, to (2005) valuation-error. In robustness checks, we impose higher cut-off values to determine whether the acquirer is overvalued such as the 5%, 10%, and 15% levels without finding an alteration in our conclusions. Table 3 presents the results of our univariate analysis of the acquirer CAR across portfolios classified by the payment method and the levels of pre-acquisition trading activity of the acquirer shares. Consistent with the conclusions reached in previous studies, the univariate analysis suggests that stock-financed acquisitions are associated with significantly lower acquirer CAR relative to cash-financed counterparts (1.18 percentage points lower acquirer CAR that is marginally significant). Interestingly, the substantial reduction in the acquirer CAR in stock-financed acquisitions is concentrated in the group of deals announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. This portfolio experiences significant wealth losses relative to both the portfolio of cash-financed deals (3.18% wealth loss, significant at the 5% level) and the portfolio of stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention (3.28% relative wealth loss, significant at the 5% level). In the latter portfolio, the acquirer CAR of -0.09 percentage points is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the acquirer shareholder wealth losses from stock-financed M&As when the acquirer is subject to low investor attention is apparent in the post-acquisition period. Specifically, in the 12-and 24-month postacquisition period, the stock-financed M&As that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention are associated with 8.5 and 12.66 percentage point declines of the acquirer value, as captured by the acquirer Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR).
Univariate analysis
(Insert Table 3 about here)
The univariate differences in the post-acquisition abnormal returns between the stock-financed M&As subject to high investor attention and their counterparts subject to low investor attention are economically large, yet statistically insignificant. In the subsequent sections, we re-evaluate these differences via a multivariate analysis that further allows us to highlight the impact of the acquirer preacquisition overvaluation.
Multivariate Evidence

The
A central part of our analysis is to investigate whether low investor attention encourages overvalued acquirers to proceed with stock-financed M&As. As such, overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention should be more likely to announce stock-rather than cash-financed M&As. Table 4 presents the outcome of two Logit models that predict the choice of the payment method (stock vs. cash) based on the acquirer valuation-error and various firm-and deal-specific features. Model (1) does not control for year-and industry-related factors while Model (2) does take them into account.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
The initial findings emphasize the role of low investor attention in encouraging overvalued acquirers to announce stock-rather cash-financed M&As. In particular, the coefficient associated with the variable (Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading) is positive, significant, and considerably larger in magnitude than the coefficient of (Overvalued Acquirer) both when the industry and year effects are included and excluded from the relevant model. This finding supports our empirical prediction by suggesting that overvalued acquirers subject to low rather than high trading activity are more likely to announce stock-financed M&As. The following subsection examines whether such acquirers, despite their high degree of overvaluation, end up realizing limited wealth losses during the announcement period due to the low investor attention dedicated to them.
Multivariate Analysis of CAR
The findings reported in Table 5 depict the valuation effects of stock-financed M&As that are announced by acquirers subject to different levels of investor attention. The dependent variable is the acquirer 5-day announcement period CAR. Models (1), (2) and (3) have the following general specification:
is the intercept referring to the acquirer CAR in cash-financed acquisitions. refers to the average announcement period CAR of stock-financed deals by acquirers that receive high investor attention. In turn, is the acquirer announcement period CAR of stock-financed deals in which the acquirer receives low investor attention (i.e. low pre-acquisition trading activity). Accordingly, represents the difference between the valuation effects of stock-financed acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to low versus high investor attention. represents the effects of k control variables known to influence the acquirer abnormal returns.
Model (1) is a baseline regression that only controls for the effect of the payment method and the level of investor attention received by the acquiring firm. The evidence reported in Model (1) suggests that, relative to cash-financed deals, stock-financed acquisitions announced by acquirers subject to high pre-acquisition trading activity experience a 4.41 percentage point decline in their existing valuations. As documented in previous research (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Fuller et al., 2002) , cash-financed deals realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns, as evidenced by the insignificant intercept. Furthermore, consistent with our predictions, the stock paying acquirers that are subject to low investor attention realize 4.17 percentage points higher CAR than their counterparts who are subject to high investor attention. That is, the negative wealth effect of stock-financed acquisitions when the acquirer is subject to high investor attention seems to be neutralized in the portfolio of stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention.
(Insert Table 5 about here)
To further clarify this conclusion, we apply the Wald test on the restriction that the coefficient of (Stock) and the coefficient of (Stock × Low Trading) are equal in magnitude but have opposite signs. The resulting p-value is 0.80, leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. Accordingly, the acquisitions announced by acquirers that are subject to low investor attention do not experience negative announcement period abnormal returns. Instead, the acquirers in these deals break-even, as in the case of counterparts in cash-financed acquisitions. Model (2) expands the specification of Model (1) by controlling for the effect of the acquirer overvaluation, which yields similar conclusions. Moreover, the restriction that the coefficient of (Stock) and the coefficient of (Stock × Low Trading) are equal in magnitude but have opposite signs is also not rejected in Model (2) (p-values of 0.66).
Model ( To directly highlight the effect of acquirer overvaluation and investor attention on the acquirer CAR, Models (4) and (5) have the following specification:
is the average CAR of overvalued acquirers that are exposed to high investor attention and engage in stock-financed M&As. In turn, is the average CAR of overvalued acquirers that are exposed to low investor attention and engage in stock-financed M&As. Therefore, the sign and magnitude of reflect the impact of acquirer exposure to low investor assessment of stock-financed deals that are announced by overvalued acquirers. Interestingly, the results in Models (4) and (5) show that the negative valuation effects of acquirer overvaluation across stockfinanced acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention is offset in the portfolio of deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention. More specifically, the Wald test of the restriction does not reject the null hypothesis with p-values of 0.14 and 0.48 in Models (4) and (5), respectively.
Put together, the results of our multivariate analysis support the key empirical prediction of this paper that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to low investor attention manage to announce their takeovers without experiencing significant announcement period wealth losses. The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis in the subsequent section further validates this conclusion.
Analysis of Comparable Deals
PSM analysis
The novel result presented in Section 5 suggests that stock-financed M&As that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention yield higher acquirer CAR relative to counterparts announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. The matching-based analysis offered in this section examines whether this conclusion holds when comparing deals with similar characteristics. We apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis exclusively on the sample of stock-financed acquisitions. To ATT can be defined as: (16) This parameter represents the average impact of low investor attention dedicated to the acquiring firm on the acquirer CAR relative to the counterfactual case in which the acquirer receives high investor attention.
If the economic conclusion presented in Section 5 holds, we expect the resulting ATT to be positive, statistically and economically significant.
In estimating ATT, a missing data problem emerges: while we have access to the acquirer CAR in stock-financed M&As that announced by acquirers receiving low investor attention, we do not have access to data representing the counterfactual case in which these acquirers receive high investor attention. Nevertheless, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985, 1983) show that conditioning on known propensity scores that have been estimated using observable characteristics W, with each propensity score representing the probability of the acquirer receiving low rather than high investor attention, is sufficient to remove the bias due to these observed covariates. Consequently, we adopt the following two-step procedure: First, on the restricted sample of stock-financed deals, we estimate a Logit model based on the acquirer-, deal-and target-specific characteristics with the dependent variable being the acquirer that is subject to low pre-acquisition trading activity (i.e. low investor attention). Second, the fitted probability estimates from this model (i.e. the propensity scores) are used in the matching analysis to create a matched sample of comparable deals that are announced by acquirers exposed to low and high investor attention. On the matched sample ATT is estimated with the following equation:
ATT is the mean difference between the acquirer CAR in each stock-financed deal that is announced by an acquirer subject to low trading, , and the mean acquirer CAR for comparable stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to high pre-acquisition trading,
. is the number of stock-financed deals that are announced by acquirers subject to low pre-acquisition trading on the matched sample (i.e. the treated observations). is the number of control (observations) deals that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention. is the number of times a deal is used as a match when matching is performed with replacement.
More specifically, based on the caliper matching (CM) algorithm, for each stock-financed deal announced by an acquirer subject to low pre-acquisition trading (i.e. treated observation), we match four stock-financed deals (untreated observations) that are announced by acquirers subject to high preacquisition trading which exhibit propensity scores that do not exceed 10% of the standard deviation of the propensity score estimates. As the sample is split in half between deals announced by acquirers subject to low and high pre-acquisition trading, we use matching with replacement whereby each untreated observation can be chosen as a match more than once. As Panel B (Table 6) shows, the resulting matched sample includes 24 treated observations and 96 untreated observations, whereby the matches are used more than once. Overall, 36 observations are dropped from the sample of stock-financed deals via the matching algorithm. Panel D (Table 6 ) demonstrates the success of the matching exercise in balancing the key empirical covariates in the analysis. More specifically, none of the differences in the means of both the estimated propensity scores and the key covariates between the treated and untreated groups appear statistically significant based on the reported t-tests in the matched sample.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
The estimation of standard errors is of critical importance in testing the hypothesis of the absence of a treatment effect. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) As Panel B (Table 6) shows, the resulting ATT estimate is 3.5 percentage points and statistically significant at the 1% level. This offers great support to the initial conclusion derived from both the univariate and the multivariate analyses (presented in Section 5). That is, after balancing the key covariates, the stock paying acquirers subject to low pre-acquisition trading activity (or low investor attention) enjoy higher announcement period CAR relative to acquirers in comparable deals where the acquirers are subject to high pre-acquisition trading (or high investor attention). This provides additional evidence suggesting that firms that receive limited investor attention and use stock as a payment method in M&As enjoy significant appreciations in their existing valuations relative to stock paying acquirers that receive high investor attention. However, one issue that still remains to be accommodated is to ensure that our results are insensitive to unobserved bias or missing covariates. In the following subsection, we examine the sensitivity of our PSM-based findings by quantifying the impact that a missing covariate should have in order to invalidate the treatment effect.
To assess whether the initial conclusion from our multivariate analysis holds on the matched sample, we estimate the following model on the sample of comparable stock-financed deals:
where is the acquirer CAR due to the announcement of an acquisition by an overvalued acquirer subject to high investor attention while presents the acquirer CAR due to the announcement of an acquisition by an overvalued acquirer subject to low investor attention. The findings show that stock-financed M&As that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention are associated with 11.5% decline in the acquirer existing valuation. However, in line with the conclusions of the initial multivariate analysis, this negative relationship is neutralized in the group of stock-financed M&As that are announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention.
Sensitivity analysis
A central aspect of the PSM method is that it mainly attempts to reduce the bias that is due to (Heckman and Robb, 1985) . Hence, the failure to introduce relevant variables to the matching analysis can lead to biased ATT estimates and inaccurate conclusions. Along these lines, Rosenbaum (2002) develops a sensitivity analysis that can accompany the use of PSM. In the context of this analysis, the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis answers the question: how strong a missing covariate needs to be, in terms of influencing the odds that the stock-financed acquisition is announced by an acquirer receiving low investor attention, in order invalidate the initial PSM-based conclusions?
In his analysis, Rosenbaum (2002) presents the parameter which in the context of this analysis can be presented in the following relation:
when , the assignment of an acquirer with low market attention between the two matched deals is equivalent to a random assignment. As the value of increases, this assignment no longer remains a random procedure. As shown by Rosenbaum (2002) , the fraction of odds can be written as:
where represents the impact of the observed covariates which cancel out. and are the unobserved covariates influencing the presence of the treatment for units and respectively. represents the influence of these covariates on the choice of treatment. Normalizing between 0 and 1, can be written as and a straightforward interpretation is that the matched units may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by at most (Rosenbaum, 2002) .
Panel B (Table 6 ) reports the outcome of the sensitivity analysis. Specifically, a missing covariate should increase the relative odds that a stock-paying acquirer is subject to low investor attention by 47%
for the treatment effect to cease to be significant at the 5% level, and by 59% for this treatment effect to cease to be significant at the 10% level. These results suggest that our empirical conclusion is relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate, especially when compared to other studies that relied on the Rosenbaum (2002) analysis in the empirical finance literature. For instance, Peel and Makepeace (2012) report a level of 1.55 to highlight the robustness of their conclusion regarding the premium received by accounting auditors. Likewise, Barbopoulos and Adra (2016) report a level of 1.50 to highlight the robustness of their conclusion with respect to the initial payments in earnout financed deals.
Analysis of the Long-Run Returns
Next, we focus on the acquirer long-run abnormal returns and attempt to investigate how they vary with the level of acquirer overvaluation, the payment method employed in the deal, and the degree of investor attention that is received by the acquiring firm in the period preceding announcement. I -financed deals by highly scrutinized acquirers is complete, we do not expect these acquirers to experience post-acquisition losses.
To further emphasize the role of the interaction between the acquirer overvaluation, the payment method, and the degree of investor attention, Models (1) and (2) have the following specification:
where is the average BHAR of overvalued acquirers that are exposed to high investor attention across stock-financed acquisitions. In turn, is the average BHAR of overvalued acquirers in stock-financed deals which are subject to low investor attention. Therefore, the sign and magnitude of highlight the impact of low acquirer investor attention on the post-acquisition value gains from stock-financed deals announced by overvalued acquirers. The dependent variable in
Model (1) is the 12-month ( acquirer BHAR while the dependent variable in Model (2) is the 24-month ( BHAR.
We test the restriction using the Wald test in both Models (1) and (2). The resulting p-values of the Wald test are 0.78 and 0.45 respectively, which suggests that the post-acquisition BHAR of stock-financed acquisitions by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor attention is economically insignificant. Hence, the initial negative reaction to stock-financed acquisitions by overvalued acquirers subject to high investor scrutiny captures the full wealth effect of the M&A.
Interestingly, in both models, we find that , i.e. the coefficient of (Stock × Overvalued Acquirer × Low Trading) is negative and statistically significant, highlighting 15 and 39 respective percentage point postacquisition wealth losses for overvalued stock paying acquirers subject to low investor attention.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
To further support the notion that the initial less adverse market response to stock-financed acquisitions that are announced by acquirers subject to low investor attention is not due to high postacquisition synergies, we analyse the acquirer s post-acquisition performance as in Heron and Lie (2002) .
We re-estimate Equation (21) with the dependent variables -acquisition return on assets (RoA) for the 12-and 24-month horizons. 8 If the initial less adverse response is due to high synergies, then after controlling for the acquirer pre-acquisition RoA and various deal-and firm-related factors, we should observe that the acquirers in stock-financed deals by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention should experience increases in their post-acquisition RoA. The lack of positive and significant postin
Models (3) and (4) suggests that the less adverse market reaction to these acquirers is not driven by high expected post-acquisition synergies. Put together, the evidence from the initial market response and the -acquisition abnormal returns and performance support our prediction regarding the role of low market attention in encouraging overvalued firms to pursue stock financed non-synergy-driven acquisitions. 8. Robustness Checks
An alternative investor attention proxy
We further examine whether our findings related to the short-and long-run valuation effects of investor attention hold with an alternative proxy. Accordingly, we re-estimate our multivariate models using the high Roll (1988) R 2 as a proxy for low investor attention. More specifically, the R 2 refers to the explanatory power of the regression: (22) 8 We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 9 An anonymous reviewer recommended that we apply the robust methodology proposed by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) which, in the context of our analysis, consists of examining the variations in the monthly difference between the logarithm of -financed deals announced by overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention and comparable stock-financed deals announced by acquirers subject to high investor attention. This analysis consists of using as independent -to-book valuations, idiosyncratic risk and momentum of returns, among others. Our analysis based on 18 size and market-to-book value matches suggests that, in the 24 months horizon, the overvalued acquirers subject to low investor attention end up realizing 71% of the wealth realized by the overvalued acquirers subject to high market attention. This evidence suggests, as predicted, a post-acquisition correction in the valuation of the overvalued acquirers subject to low market attention. This relative wealth difference is significant at the 10% level. These results are available from the authors upon request.
are regressed on both the market and sector returns in the window from 240 to 10 days before the day of the acquisition announcement (t). The assumption supporting this approach is that the higher the correlation between the stock returns with the market and sector returns, the less likely it is that the prevailing stock price reflects new information collected by investors. The high Roll R 2 has been used as proxy for low investor attention (i.e. low price informativeness) in previous studies such as Chen et al. (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2010) .
Multivariate evidence
In Table 8 we present two regressions with the same specifications of Model (5) reported in Table   5 and Model (2) reported in Interestingly, more than 70% of the acquirers classified as subject to low investor attention are also classified as acquirers subject to high Roll R 2 .
(Insert Table 8 about here)
The results of both models are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Sections 5 and 7. The evidence reported in Model (1) (Table 8) suggests that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to high investor attention (i.e., low Roll R 2 ) experience a significant reduction in their announcement period CAR (8 percentage points). Nevertheless, this initial wealth effect is neutralized in the group of deals announced by overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to low investor attention (i.e., high Roll R 2 ). 10 notion that the overvalued stock-paying acquirers subject to limited investor attention experience a significant post-acquisitions correction in their valuations. More specifically, these acquirers experience 38% decline in their post-announcement BHAR compared to the overvalued stock-paying acquirers which are subject to high investor attention. Overall, our analysis of the wealth effects of M&As using the Roll R 2 as an alternative investor attention proxy provides the same qualitative conclusions as the analysis -acquisition trading activity.
11 10 The matching-based results using the high Roll R 2 as a proxy for low investor attention are available from the authors upon request. 11 In untabulated results, we have re-estimated the Logit model from Table 4 with the High values of Roll R 2 as a proxy for low market attention. Our results, which are available from the authors upon request, suggest that overvalued acquirers are more likely to engage in stock-financed acquisitions relative undervalued acquirers (as classified within the low Roll R 2 ). This difference is significant at the 10% level.
Conclusion
A stylized finding in the corporate finance and M&A literature is that the acquirers using their own shares RST) . N is the number of deals in each category and (%) is the percentage of deals in this category relative to the total number of deals (513). Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of these sectors. In estimating the post-acquisition BHAR and RoA, deals by acquirers who made more than other acquisitions during the month before the acquisition, the month of the acquisition, and the month after the acquisition are excluded to ensure that the long-term effects are not conflated. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. to the 12-and 24-month Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHAR) across various groups of deals based on the method of payment used and the is estimated based on the level of daily trading volume relative to listed shares in the period of 43 to 10 subject to high (low) market attention if the level of its share turnover is above (below) the 70 th percentile in the original sample. The univariate analysis is reported for the overall groups of stock and cash financed deals, stock financed deals with acquirers subject to high and low market pre-acquisition trading in addition to cash financed deals. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the 5-day announcement period acquirer CAR. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. Note: This table reports the outcome of the Propensity Score Matching analysis that estimates the wealth effect of the presence of an acquirer whose shares are subject to low trading activity on the sample of stock financed acquisitions. The outcome variable is of daily traded to listed shares is below the 50 th percentile in the sample. The propensity scores are estimated via a Logit model where the dependent variable is Low Trading. Variables are included in this Logit model provided that such an inclusion improves the balance of the key covariates in the matched sample. Panel A reports the Logit model used to estimate the propensity scores. Panel B reports the outcome of the matching analysis. More specifically, this panel reports the caliper used in the matching, the ratio of matched observations to each treated observation, the number of treated and control observations in the matched sample, the estimated ATT with the Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors and the cut-off 10% level of significance. These outcomes are reported based on the Caliper Matching algorithm with a caliper of 0.1. Four untreated deals (i.e., High Trading) are matched to each treated deal (i.e., Low Trading) while allowing each untreated deal to be used as a match more than once. Overall, 36 observations are dropped from the analysis in the matched sample. Panel C presents the outcome of the regression analysi balancing the propensity scores and the key empirical variables. The mean value of each of these variables in the treated group and the control group and the bootstrapped p-value from the t-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically equal to 0 are reported before and after the matching. ***,**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. (1) is the 12-month BHAR. In turn, the dependent variable in Model (1) is the 24-during the 12 and 24 months after the acquisition, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables. Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the 5-day announcement period acquirer CAR (Model 1) and 24-month BHAR (Model 2) with the high acquirer Roll R 2 used as a proxy of low market scrutiny. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. N indicates the number of observations. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Please refer to Appendix 1 for an accurate description of the variables.
